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This paper aims to provide insights into human perception, navigation performance and 
confidence in helicopter overland navigation. Helicopter overland navigation is a challenging 
mission area because it is a complex cognitive task, and failing to recognize when the aircraft 
is off-course can lead to operational failures and mishaps. A human-in-the-loop experiment 
to investigate pilot misperception during simulated overland navigation by analyzing actual 
navigation trajectory, pilots’ perceived location, and corresponding confidence levels was 
designed. Fifteen military officers with prior overland navigation experience completed four 
simulated low-level navigation routes, two of which entailed auto-navigation. Analysis shows 
that there is no correlation between perceived and actual location of the aircraft, nor 
between confidence level and actual location. There is however some evidence that there is a 
negative correlation between perceived location and intended route of flight, suggesting that 
there is a bias towards that intended flight route. If aviation personnel can proactively 
identify the circumstances in which usual misperception occur in navigation, they may 
reduce mission failure and mishap rate. Fleet squadrons and instructional commands can 
benefit from this study to improve operations that require low-level flight while also 
improving crew resource management. 
Nomenclature 
AGL = above ground level 
GPS =  global positioning system 
NM   =   nautical miles 
OTW =  out-the-window 
PAC =  pilot-at-control 
PNAC = pilot-not-at-control 
RMS =  root-mean-square 
SDT = signal detection theory 
TERF =  terrain flight 
TFH =  total flight hours 
VFR  =   visual flight rules 
I. Introduction 
elicopter overland navigation is a necessary but challenging mission area that is also a complex cognitive task.
Low-level navigation, or “terrain flight” (TERF), is defined as overland flight below 200 feet above ground
level (AGL) 
1
. This environment is challenging because the low flight level reduces the amount of terrain that the 
pilot can see, and requires intense emphasis on flight parameters while simultaneously shortening reaction time to 
flight obstacles. Helicopter overland navigation is comprised of a number of sub-skills that require continuous visual 
cue perception and decision making. “Pilot Not At the Controls” (PNAC) is primarily responsible for accurate 
navigation and he must remain oriented at all times, monitor cockpit instruments, and perform assigned cockpit 
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duties as briefed. During an emergency, he executes the emergency procedures as briefed by the pilot”1. The 
navigational task can be done by visual navigation, dead reckoning, or electronic navigation using Global 
Positioning System (GPS), or some other system such as radio aids to Navigation (NAVAIDs). Visual navigation is 
performed by comparing terrain features on a map to what is seen out the window of the aircraft. Dead reckoning 
involves taking a known position inferring location by using direction and timing. Advances in GPS technology 
have decreased the use of visual navigation and dead reckoning, yet GPS technology is restricted in many aircraft by 
regulation
2
 to a  backup form of navigation. The PNAC may use all three forms of navigation, separately or in 
combination, in order to accurately navigate through low-level terrain; genrally the various methods of naviation are 
cross-checked against each other to give the pilots high confidence in their posisiton. On top of this heavy 
navigational workload, the PNAC’s most important role is to assist the Pilot At the Controls (PAC) in obstacle 
avoidance. Because of the complex cognitive task placed on the nonflying aviator, it is easy to deviate from course. 
Straying off course is not an issue if the aviator is aware of being off course. However, often the aviator is unaware 
of being off course. 
  We focused on the navigation aspect of terrain flight; our simulated aircraft was held at constant altitude and 
did not experience emergencies – two critical dimensions of real-world TERF navigation. “Proficient navigation 
during low-level flight requires training and practice. Identifying check points (CPs) is the critical task, since this 
requires the navigator to be proficient in map reading, terrain interpretation, and correlation of terrain features with 
map symbols. He must be able to visualize from the map how the terrain along the flight path should look. He must 
also be able to look at the terrain, identify his location, and locate it on the map”1.  
Low-level VFR Navigation requires efficient visual scanning. Visual scanning is the ability to recognize and 
reference key terrain features in a given field of view. These key terrain features will allow the navigator to 
recognize waypoints and intermediate check points along the route. Pilots must also “be prepared for the terrain to 
look differently than as planned and adjust as necessary”1.  This statement is especially true at night where shading 
and culutual lighting may make the terrain appear different than expected.  
Misperception can lead to both mission failure by the aircraft not reaching its intended destination on time, and 
also mishaps due to the pilot flying into obstacles in the terrain. The Navy Safety Center has adopted James 
Reason’s “Swiss cheese” model for understanding the underlying process that results in mishaps3. The Swiss cheese 
model relates a system to a stack of slices of Swiss cheese. Each slice of cheese is a layer of the system, and the 
holes are analogous to opportunities for the system to fail. Mishaps occur only when the holes line up allowing 
failures to pass through without being stopped by another system. This research focuses on the slice that relates to 
pilot judgment. A recent mishap involving a senior pilot and aircrew flying a MH-60S under daytime clear 
atmospheric conditions illustrates the reason for our research. The senior pilot had a vast knowledge of the area, but 
decided to not follow course rules back to their home station. They hit power lines and crashed the helicopter. This 
mishap was due to overconfidence in the pilot on where they perceived they were flying. The pilot’s confidence 
contributed to the complacency of the co-pilot and aircrew. Luckily, no one was killed, but it did highlight the fact 
that misperception can have drastic consequences. 
II. Pilot misperception and confidence during helicopter overland naviation
Ref. 4 presents a matrix derived from signal detection theory (SDT) showing the four different awareness states 
of a navigating pilot
4
. The most concerning area is marked “Dangerous”, where the crew believes that they are on 
course when they are not. This type of misperception can lead to both mission failure by the aircraft not reaching its 
intended destination on time and also mishaps due to the pilot flying into obstacles in the terrain. 








Struggling. No accurate fix, 
aware that aircraft is off track 
Dangerous. Lost and doesn’t 
realize it. Positively misidentified 
correlating features. 
High 
On course and lucky. Accurate 
fix, but not confident in 
navigation solution. 
Skilled performer. On track and 
certain. 
In Ref. 5, navigation and eye scan pattern data were collected from 12 military officers who underwent an 
overland navigation simulation. This experiment had pilots navigate through 12 waypoints in a simulation terrain 
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model of Twentynine Palms, CA. Regression anlaysis showed flight performance measures such as RMS (root-
mean square) error were not predicted by the expertise level of pilots. However, gaze parameters and scan 
management skills were predicted by the expertise level. Most relevant to this study, analysis through Flight and Eye 
Scan visualization Tool (FEST, Fig. 1a) showed that some pilots had biased perception. As shown in Fig. 1b, subject 
5  missed a waypoint and started to track north of the intended route
6
. The subject missed waypoint 6 and took a left 
turn into this valley (6') as shown in Fig. 1b. Then, he flew north of the intended trajectory (7' and 8'), believing he 
was on waypoints 7 and 8. Initially planned waypoints are shown in black whereas the subject’s estimation is shown 
in blue. On his way from waypoint 6' to 7', he saw a valley on the right side of the flight heading direction in the 
OTW scene. If he had been on track (i.e., between 6 and 7), he would have been surrounded by hills and should not 
have been able to see any saddle or valley and his heading would have been much different. Even though his gaze 
data showed that he scanned the valley, the pilot did not question his orientation. Instead of using available visual 
cues on the flight simulation screen or out-the-window (OTW) to realize that he was off course, he perceived that he 
was still on course. This pattern suggests the pilot was using some biased visual cueing in which he overweighed 
OTW cues that fit into his perception that he was on course, and disregarded OTW cues that did not fit with his 
hypothesis.  
Not only did the subject show misperception, but also a strong confidence at the same time. When the subject 
redirected whenever they were off-track about 1 km away from the intended route following the experiment 
protocol, s/he was very reluctant to follow the experimenter’s redirection expressing a strong confidence believing 
that s/he was on-track. These somewhat unexpected phenomenona has been observed on several pilots during the 
experiment and we started to question whether one’s confidence is indeed correlated to their navigation performance 
or not, or that one’s confidence may even increase with greater navigation errors. If a participant perceived 
themselves to be “lost,” they would be able to recognize that fact and therefore have a corresponding low confidence 
level. Next, we noted that subjects’ bias did not seem arbitrary, rather it showed a pattern or consistency. The bias 
was toward the planned route trajectory. Connecting with their observed high confidence, we started to question 
whether pilots’ high confidence is related to this bias toward the intended route rather than their actual current 
location. This paper proposes to support these experimental observations, which is contrary to a common belief that 
confidence is a good indicator of good performance
7
, through human-in-the-loop experiments. The goal of the 
experiment was to place a participant with navigation experience in a situation where only visual terrain cues were 
available for navigating. To test our notions about perception, performance, and confidence, we test several 
hypotheses, listed below: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative correlation between confidence and distance from participant’s perceived 
location and  actual helicopter position.  
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative correlation between confidence and distance from participant’s perceived 
location and the intended route of flight. 
Hypothesis 3:  The longer a participant navigates through an intended route, the greater the distance between the 
perceived location and the actual helicopter position. 
a) FEST (Flight and Eye Scan visualization Tool) b) Subject 5’s actutal flight trajectory (blue)
Figure 1. Biased perception shown during the overland navigation.
5,6
 Note that subject five’s actual 
trajectory and his estimated perception (6',7' and 8') are away from the planned route (black line connected 
with circles)  
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Hypoetheis 4:  Confidence decreases the further into the navigation route. 
III. Methods: Simulator-Based Human-in-the-Loop Experiments
A. Paricipants 
There were a total of 15 participants ranging from 27 to 41 years of age, with an average of 36 years with a 
standard deviation of 4.8. Total flight hours (TFH) ranged from 0 to 2,500 with an average of 1,431 and a standard 
deviation of 803.5. Total overland hours ranged from 0 to 2,000 with an average of 870 and a standard deviation of 
634.2 hours. There were eleven U.S. Navy, four U.S. Army participants, and one Hellenic Air Force participant. To 
participate in this experiment the participant needed to have overland navigation training. Participants for this study 
were recruited from the Naval Postgraduate School student body and faculty. Recruitment was completed through 
an IRB approved e-mail sent to Operations Research Department and Modeling, Virtual Environments and 
Simulation (MOVES) students.  
B. Equipment 
The software used to run the simulation was Image Generator, Terrain & Map D8, Data Logger by Delta3D and 
OpenSceneGraph. These programs used inputs through X-Plane 9.21rc2, a commercially used flight simulator. The 
software converts the X-Plane data into the OTW and map views based on the participants inputs. A 43” by 24” 
screen was used to present the OTW view and 33” by 33” disply for the map and cockpit view. The X-Plane and the 
Image Generator were set with a modernized autopilot flying at 150 ft AGL at 65 knots. This altitude remained fixed 
throughout the route and maintained obstacle clearance in the mountainous terrain. Moving the joystick up and 
down did not affect the pitch of the aircraft, but did allow the participant to look up and down. The roll of the 
aircraft was completed with left or right joystick inputs. This put the aircraft in coordinated turns. The software also 
updated the instruments to correspond with the current flight profile.  
Confidence App Software was created in order gain useful confidence output data. This program allowed the 
participant to click where they perceived themselves to be on the map display. After the participant right-clicked on 
the map, a red dot showed on the screen and a confidence scroll bar appeared. This confidence bar allowed the 
participant to rate how confident they were of their perceived location. This bar ranged from 100, very confident, to 
0, very lost. After the route was complete, the software also created a text file that contained the elapsed time of 
when the participant made his location estimate, the actual helicopter latitude and longitude, the participant’s 
estimated latitude and longitude, and the participant’s confidence on their perceived location. Fig. 2 shows a 
schematic diagram of the experimental setup and Confidence App Interface. 
a) Schematic Diagram of Experiment Setup b) Confidence App Interface
Figure 2. Joystick input is read by X-Plane and initiates the Image Generator, which then displays 
the OTW, map, and instrument outputs to the participant and instructor. Red dot indicates where 
participants clicked on the map and the scroll bar marks the associated confidence level. 
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C. Visual navigation task 
The route needed to be in a location that did not favor any particular pilot’s previous fleet experience and 
covered an area that had challenging terrain so that there was great possibility of misperceiving the surroundings. 
Finally, it needed to be an area adequately mapped in FALCONVIEW to use in our analysis. The mountainous area 
of Twentynine Palms was selected for this experiment for several reasons. The first was that the area includes some 
landmarks, and there are multitudes of executable routes. Secondly, most of the participants of the study had not 
operated in this area. Finally, we consider the high altitude desert terrain to be comparable to the current operating 
environments in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
After choosing the operating area, routes were selected to support hypothesis testing. To collect sufficient data, 
four routes were generated, along with a practice route. The participant had to navigate through the route using a 
joystick which controlled heading (roll) only; participants had no control over yaw, power, or airspeed. Participants 
were able to control pitch, but the simulator was set up such that pitch changes did not have accompanying altitude 
and airspeed changes. The pilots did not have to control attitude, airspeed, rotor speed or turn coordination 
(commonly referred to as “ball”, due to the setup of the turn-and-slip indicator in real aircraft), therefore greatly 
simplifying the navigational task. For the last two routes, a scripted “autopilot” guided the participant along a set 
course without their control.  
The auto-navigation routes were added to normalize the experiment in the following manner:  If all of the 
participants were able to control the helicopter through the routes, each pilot would see different terrain features 
because the probability of two independent pilots flying the same course is practically zero. Controlling the route 
with the autopilot allowed the experiment proctor to pause the route at the exact same points, so that each participant 
sees the same terrain. More than this, it ensures that each pilot is presented the terrain identically – that they 
approach it from the same azimuth and roll angle. Appendix  includes all four routes designed in this study. 
 With the number and types of routes chosen, the waypoints comprising the route were selected. The routes 
needed to be fair, yet challenging enough for the pilots to get off-course. We subjectively created routes that were 
appropriate for a late-first tour aviator’s level of experience, approximately 750-1000 total hours. The practice route 
was designed to get the participant familiar with the control of the helicopter, feel comfortable using the confidence 
program, establish a scan pattern, and gain familiarity with the interfaces. The practice route was a short, four-
waypoint route. This route was based off prominent landmarks, yet still required the pilot to make large heading 
changes.  
D. Procedure 
Participants were introduced to the experimentation lab with an IRB approved welcome script that notified the 
participant of the focus of the study, brief overview of what will be expected out of them, rules of the lab, and the 
voluntary nature of the study. The participants were given an informed consent form to read and sign. The form 
reviewed the minimal risks, the voluntary nature, the benefits, and confidentiality of participating in this experiment. 
After the informed consent, the participant was given a questionnaire relating to their flying experience and 
background. The background questionnaire included basic demographics, familiarity of the simulation-operating 
environment, experience with overland navigation, flight hours, and time since last flight. This data was collected to 
help group the participants for analysis. 
Once the participant completed the background questionnaire, they were given a familiarization to the 
experiment; including the flight parameters of the helicopter, what was contained on the video screens, joystick 
control, and how to use the confidence feature of the simulation. Once the participant seemed comfortable with how 
the simulation would run, they were given a map of the practice route. This was an 8x11 map printed from 
Falconview. The map was a 1:50K TLM, just like the one that they would see on the monitor. This map was 
annotated, or “doghoused”, with the waypoint number, distance in NM, time to fly the leg at 60 knots, and total 
elapsed time. This paper map was only allowed during the map study, and not during the flight portion of the 
simulation. The participant could only use the map on the monitor, which included numbered waypoints, during the 
simulation. The participant were given unlimited time to review the practice map before flying the simulation. The 
practice simulation was four waypoints long on an easy route. One of the main objectives of the practice route was 
to make the participant comfortable with the flight profile and monitor views, along with getting a solid grasp of 
using the confidence program. This route was paused roughly every 30 seconds for the participant to point out their 
perceived location on the map, and their confidence level. The participant were given some navigation assistance 
from the proctor if they were lost. Once the participant completed the route, they were asked if they were 
comfortable with the simulation and programs. They were allowed to have extra practice flying the helicopter if they 
were not comfortable. 
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After the completion of the practice route, the participant were tasked with completing four navigation routes 
where data was collected. In the first two routes, the participant were providing roll inputs while flying, whereas the 
last two routes were flown on autopilot. The first two routes began with a map study period of three minutes, in 
contrast the last two map study times were two minutes. Map study times were limited to provide increased 
difficulty by limiting the amount of headings and timings on the route, and to keep the experiment under an hour in 
duration. The last two map study times were less because the routes were shorter, and the helicopter was on auto-
navigation, reducing the task load on the participant. Before executing the auto-navigation route, the participants 
were also given a scenario. In this scenario, the participant simulates flying with a new pilot in the squadron who is 
responsible for the navigating and flying. Both the new pilot and the participant must fly in an area where they have 
never been. The new pilot is supposed to follow the route, but there is a chance that they can get off-track. The 
scenario informs the participant that the intended route is not necessarily what the new pilot will fly. Once the map 
study was complete, the participant conducted the navigation portion of the simulation. During the first two 
simulations, the route was paused about every 40 seconds. 40 seconds was not a hard number because the evaluator 
wanted to minimize pausing during turns. Pausing during turns can be disorienting to participants, and it is hard to 
remember the amount of bank they had after they finished the pause. During the second two simulations, the pause 
points were in the same location for each participant, and happened between 20–40 seconds. Again, these pauses 
occurred during level flight. After the completion of each of the navigation routes, the participants were given a post 
task questionnaire. It questioned whether the participant felt they strayed off-course, misperceived terrain, and asked 
what they could have done differently to remain on-course. 
Once all four routes were completed, the participants were given one final questionnaire. This questionnaire 
covered topics on why they believe pilots get lost, what they do if they sense they are not on-course, and what they 
think their confidence level during navigation is. This questionnaire allowed for participant grouping based off 
similar responses. The participants were asked to add any additional comments, and the evaluator asked other 
pertinent questions to give insights on why they misperceived terrain on the route and confidence levels. 
E. Statistical analysis and variable definition 
We used Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (ρ) to determine statistical dependence between variables for 
the first two hypothesis tests. Paired t-test or two-sample t-test were used when appropriate. The significance level, 
α, was set at 0.05. Demographic variables were collected from the background questionnaire that included TFH, 
overland flight hours, participation in similar past experiments, and experience with low-level and desert low-level 
navigation.  
There were two major dependent variables used for analysis; 1) confidence and 2) the distance from the actual 
helicopter position to the perceived position. Pilots’ confidence was self-reported using the Confidence App, i.e., 
participants rated their navigation confidence from 0 to 1 for each pause point. The CONF is defined as confidence 
measurement between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates the lowest confidence and 1 the highest confidence. CONF_BIN is 
a variation of CONF coerced into a binary variable. The CONF_BIN is defined “high” if CONF ≥ 0.5 and “low” 
otherwise. The threshold of 0.5 was chosen for the CONF_BIN variable because it was the numerical midpoint of 
the CONF range. This midpoint was easily defined on the Confidence App, making it a likely division between high 
confidence and low confidence. If a participant believed there was a good chance their perceived location is not 
close to the actual location they would not choose a confidence level over 0.5. 
The error in perceived location was derived from the great circle distance
8
 between the actual latitude and 
longitude position of the aircraft and the participant’s perceived latitude and longitude:  
                                               –      (1) 
where ERROR1  =  great circle distance between perceived and actual location (km), 
R =  Earth’s radius at the Twentynine Palms, CA area = 6372.8 km, 
φa  = Latitude of the actual aircraft position in radians, 
φp  = Latitude of the perceived aircraft position in radians, 
χa  = Longitude of the actual aircraft position in radians, and 
χp  = Longitude of the perceived aircraft position in radians. 
Similarly, the second type of error that was calculated was the distance between where the participant perceived 
they were compared to the intended route of flight: 
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                                               –       (2) 
where ERROR2  =  great circle distance between perceived and planned (intended) location (km), 
φi  = Latitude of the planned (intended) aircraft position in radians, and 
χi  = Longitude of the panned (intended) aircraft position in radians. 
The NAV is a variation of ERROR1 coerced into a binary variable, indicating whether the participant stayed 
within a certain threshold/boundary. Pilots were instructed to stay within .5 km of the route; we buffered this to be 
.75 km. The NAV is defined “On-track” if ERROR1 < 0.75 km and “Off-track” otherwise. The 0.75 km distance for 
obtaining the NAV variable was used because participants were told prior to their navigation tasks that they should 
be confident in their perceived location if they were within 0.5km of their actual location. The 0.75 km gave the 
subjects an additional 0.25 km error distance because it is difficult for pilots to recognize if they fell within the 0.5 
km distance exactly while navigating. This additional error distance also helped to affirm, without any doubt, that 
the participant had the wrong perception of their location.  
IV. Experimental Results
A. Comprehensive navigation performance 
The comprehensive analysis of the data related the experiment output to the Ref. 4’s modified SDT matrix for 
assessing navigation skills. Table 2. shows experimental data of the confidence versus navigational error using the 
CONF_BIN and NAV variables. 
Table 2. Matrix of experimental navigation performance relating CONF_BIN and NAV. Percentages in 
parentheses are calculated based on Off-track or On-track NAV respectively. Of interest is the bolded area, 




















Grand Total 14.7% 85.3% 100% 
Table 2 shows that 58.3% of the time during the navigation participants were On-track and had a corresponding 
high confidence level. This table also shows that only 7.0% of time pilots had low confidence yet still were 
considered On-track. These percentages reflect that the subject was highly unlikely to misperceive their location 
when on-track, but the problem arose when the participants were Off-track. Subjects were off-track, yet still highly 
confident 27.0% of the time during the navigation. This indicates subjects were highly confident about their 
navigation performance 77.9% of the time when they were off-track. The misperception error is about 3.5 times 
greater than correct perception when a pilot is off track. This relates to the dangerous section of the matrix where 
pilots are lost and do not know it, and this is the second largest navigational state of the experiment among four 
navigational states. It is also in this area where mission failure and mishaps occur due to incorrect navigation. 
Table 3 shows that the confidence and correctness for each route align with the overall breakout. The most 
interesting fact that Table 3 shows is that the auto navigation routes (3 and 4) had a lower percentage of route 
correctness, 73.5% and 71.7% for routes 1 and 2 versus 64.4% and 65.2% for routes 3 and 4 respectively. The 
participants misperceive their location more frequently when control inputs were not required from them. Some 
explanations for this could be due to complacency, and/or experiment fatigue. During the auto navigation routes, 
participants seemed to be more relaxed during the navigation and map study. Participants were less likely to be 
actively tracking the course, which lead them to believe that the aircraft was heading on course. This type of 
complacency is common in multi-piloted aircraft and can be attributed to mishaps. Also noteworthy is the fact that 
route 3 had the highest percentage of time in the “dangerous” quadrant. Order effects may explain why route 3 was 
higher than the other routes. The “dangerous” quadrant of route 3 could be higher than that of route 1 and 2 because 
route 3 was the first time the participant dealt with auto-navigation. Additionally, route 3 could also be higher than 
route 4 because they pilot realized at the end of route 3 that the auto-navigation did not follow the intended route of 
 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
8 
flight, making the CONF on route 4 less than 3. This would correspond to a lower amount of time in the 
“dangerous” quadrant.  The auto-navigation segments are important because they represent the situation of a junior 
pilot flying a route with an experienced, senior (and presumably, better) navigator.  
Table 3 Matrix of experimental navigation performance for each route comparing navigation performance 
and confidence. the auto navigation routes (3 and 4) had a lower percentage of route correctness, 73.5% and 
71.7% for routes 1 and 2 versus 64.4% and 65.2% for routes 3 and 4 respectively. 
Assessing Navigation Performance 
Route 
1 2 3 4 Average 
NAV and 
CONF_BIN 














































Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
B. Hypothesis testing 
Hypothesis 1: We fail to reject the first null hypothesis, i.e., confidence and distance from particiapant’s 
perceived location to actual helicopter position are not correlated for all 4 routes. Note that failing to reject the null 
hypothesis 1 is compatibile with what we observed from the previous experiment. Failing to reject the null 
hypothesis for this case could be a causal factor for pilots getting off-track, along with the associated mishaps and 
mission failures.  
Hypothesis 2: We can reject the second null hypothesis, i.e., confidence and distance from participant’s 
perceived location to intended route of flight are correlated for  route1 (ρ = -0.65, p<0.05) and  route 4 (ρ = -0.60, 
p<0.05). This means that the participant has high confidence when they believe they are close to the intended route 
for routes 1 and 4 regardless of their actual closeness. This result shows that there is evidence of biased visual 
perception favoring their intended location. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a statistically significant difference in ERROR1 at the beginning of the route and 
ERROR1 at the end of the route for all four routes (t(14) =-2.067, p<0.05; t(14) =-3.150, p<0.005; t(14) =-7.708, 
p<0.001; t(14) =-2.816, p<0.01) . This suggests that the longer the participant flies, their perception error increases. 
This result can help pilots realize that they might want to reevaluate their perceived location the further along the 
route they are, and reduce their corresponding confidence in their location. 
Hypothesis 4:  There is a statistically significant difference in CONF at the beginning of the route and CONF at 
the end of the route for all four routes (t(14) =3.105, p<0.005; t(14) =2.401, p<0.05; t(14) =2.310, p<0.05; t(14) 
=2.902, p<0.005) . This suggest that the longer the participant navigates along a route, their corresponding 
confidence becomes lower. This result follows along with hypothesis 3, that the perceived error appears to increase 
the longer the participant navigates. Pilots CONF is reducing with an increasing ERROR1. Although there is no 
correlation between CONF and ERROR1, there is a trending effect of CONF getting lower further into the route 
while ERROR1 is increasing. 
V. Discussion 
Analysis showed that there exists no correlation between perceived and actual location of the aircraft, nor 
between confidence level and actual location. There is however some evidence that there is a negative correlation 
between perceived location and intended route of flight, suggesting that there is a bias towards that intended flight 
route. Fig. 3 shows three types of errors that can be defined in the corresponding navigation scenario. ERRORpa = 
ERROR1 as defined in Eq. (1), ERRORpi = ERROR2 as defined in Eq. (2) and ERRORai is a distance between 
actual and intended location. We ran post-hoc analysis on a correlation between pilot confidence and ERRORai, 
which did not show a statistical significance as between ERROR1 and pilot perception. This result again supported 
that pilot confidence is not correlated with actual and perceived performance of pilot. 
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Fig. 4 shows data for each error type from all four routes. ERRORpa (=ERROR1) is larger than ERRORpi 
(=ERROR2) for all four routes (t(14) =8.639, p<0.001; t(14) =7.933, p<0.001; t(14) =5.599, p<0.001; t(14) =3.945, 
p<0.001). ERROR3 was larger than ERROR2 for all four routes too (t(14) =4.882, p<0.001; t(14) =5.150, p<0.001; 
t(14) =6.689, p<0.001; t(14) =3.555, p<0.001). ERROR3 was smaller than ERROR1 for routes 1, 2, and 4 (t(14) 
=4.936, p<0.001; t(14) =5.382, p<0.001; t(14) =2.820, p<0.005). The analysis indicates that pilots tend to 
overestimate their performance in general, and the bias is toward their expectation.  
We can confirm the bias on the navigation map showing all three locations, i.e., the helicopter’s actual trajectory, 
pilots’ perceived location, and intended route. Fig. 5 shows representative misperception that fifteen pilots 
Figure 4. Comparison of the three errors for each route. Note that ERRORpa (black circle) is the 
biggest and ERRORpi (red cross) is the smallest of all. 











































































Figure 3. Three types of errors, i.e., ERRORpa, ERRORpi and ERRORai. ERRORpa = ERROR1 
and ERRORpi = ERROR2. 
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experienced during the navigation. The thick black line indicates the helicopter’s actual trajectory, diamonds 
correspond to each pause point, and matching color circles represent pilots’ perceived locations. Thin black lines 
with connecting circles are planned/intenended routes. It is clear that pilots’ perceived locations mostly do not match 
with actual locations.  Instead, perception matches with the intended route.  
Ref. 6 presents a preliminary model of pilot visual misperception using a Bayesian framework as shown in Table 
4. Bayes’ law relates the conditional probability and the marginal probabilities of what the pilot observes OTW and
the actual position of the aircraft. This paper provides a follow-up experiments for supporting the observed 
misperception and the Bayesian framework. 
Table 4. Visual misperception modeling
6
Perception type Posterior probability 
Bayesian agent (A)         
           
                         
Misperception Type 1 (B1)                           when        ≈ 1 
Misperception Type 2 (B2)         
           
                            
     when        ≈ 1 
Misperception Type 3 (B3)                       when        ≈ 0 
Figure 5. Obvious pilot misperception showing a consistent bias. Actual 
helicopter trajectory (thick black line); pause point to let pilots mark 
their perceived location and confidence (diamonds); pilots’ perceived 
locations (colored circles) from human-in-the-loop experiment 
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Pilots were grouped into Expert (= TFH>1000 hrs) and Novice (= TFH<1000 hrs) to examine the expertise 
effect on CONF, ERROR1, and ERROR2. The experiment included 11 Expert and 4 Novice participants according 
to the threshold 1000 hrs. Student t tests between Expert and Novice groups were conducted for each route, and no 
statistical significance was found. This result is surprising, and can again be helpful for crew coordination purposes. 
Although a pilot may have a lot of flight hours, it does not mean that their perception is better than Novice pilots.  
We note that while many of the pilots considered themselves expert, none were ‘current’ in the sense that the 
minimum time since last flight was six months.   
We also examined if there is any correlation between pilots who have experience with low-level desert 
navigation and those who have very little to none. There were 7 partcipants who had low-level desert navigation 
experience and 8 who did not. The Student t-test revealed a statistical significance (t(7) =2.675, p<0.05) in Route 1 
on ERROR 2 only. The result showed that pilots who were less familiar with the task tend to have more bias toward 
the intended route. However, we were not able to find the statistical significane in the other routes, and expertise 
effects should be examined further.  
This experiment had three participants who had previously conducted a similar experiment. These participants 
could have a learning effect because they had already seen a similar OTW view and controlled a simulated aircraft. 
These participants had seen a route in Ref. 4, so they could have an advantage over other participants during the two 
auto-navigation routes that were based off the route. Analysis was conducted to see if these three participants 
skewed the data. We found no learning effect in the participants. 
Scenario (route) differences: there was statistically significantly different CONF between some of the routes. 
The difference in CONF is not too surprising, because the routes were set up to have varying difficulties. Route 1 
was supposed to be harder than route 2, causing the CONF to be lower in route 2 than route 1. With a harder route, 
there are more chances for the participant to get off-track, thereby reducing their CONF level. Route 3 and 4 were 
set up to be similar, but there is a large difference in the data. The participants’ realization at the end of route 3 that 
the autopilot did not follow the intended route may have caused the difference. This realization may havecaused the 
participant to be less confident in the location of route 4. The data shows that there was not a trending effect of 
increased or reduced confidence throughout the experiment. Regarding ERROR1 and ERROR2, there were no 
scenario differences found. 
Power analysis was conducted for the significant correlation coefficients for routes 1 and 4 of hypothesis 2. The 
power ranges between .78 and .86 given a sample size = 15,  α = .05, and observed  ρ= .60 ~.65. This power is high 
considering the small sample size of the experiment, meaning that pilot bias toward the intended route is likely
9
. 
At the completion of the navigation and debriefing portion of the experiment, the participants were given a Post 
Task Questionnaire. This questionnaire was written to answer two questions. The first was to obtain navigation 
techniques that the more successful pilots used, while the latter was an attempt to normalize CONF levels. In the 
attempt to normalize the CONF levels, some interesting outcomes arose. The first being that only one participant felt 
that pilots were not over reliant on navigation equipment like GPS, with six neutral responses and eight positive. 
The second result of the questionnaire is that 12 of the 15 participants thought that it was easy to misinterpret terrain 
during overland navigation, with the other three responses being neutral. The last questionnaire output was the most 
interesting. Only two participants (13.3%) believed that they were overconfident in their navigation skills. This is 
surprising considering the percentage of time the participants were in the “dangerous” quadrant of flight. When the 
participant was Off-track, they had a high confidence, or wrong perception. This suggests that pilots are 
misperceiving their overconfidence during navigation. 
VI. Conclusion
In this paper we have demonstrated a methodology for determining the relationship between pilot perception and 
performance, and conducted an initial study. As helicopter missions, both civil and military, are frequently held at 
low altitude over varying terrain the importance of visual navigation, even augmented by GPS and other systems, 
will not be diminished in the near-term. Military aircraft frequently fly over rugged terrain to find targets (or 
survivors). Civil aircraft, such as “Life Flight” helicopters rely on visual navigation to find and recover their 
patients.  
In our initial exercise of the model, we find that there is no significant relationship between a pliot’s confidence 
and accuracy in navigation. Suprisingly, we find that there is also no significant relationship between a pilot’s 
experience and the accuracy of his navigational self-assessment.  
It is the second finding that we have the most interest in, and our immediate recommendation across rotary-wing 
aviation is to include syllabus events for both initial and refresher pilots where they test  their navigation skills in a 
simulator, and then are shown the correctness of their route. This would serve to demonstrate to pilots that their self-
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assessments may not be accurate, with the intended goal of making their assessments more conservative. It would 
also demonstrate to Leadership that the problem of confidence vs. correctness in navigation is not just a ‘nugget’ 
(junior pilot) problem, but is prevelant across all ranks. 
In this regard, the syallabus event we propose is similar to decompression chamber training, where pilots are 
asked to perform a cognitive task such as simple addition while experiencing mild hypoxia. The goal of our 
proposed event is the same as chamber training – to prove to the pilots in question that yes, navigation errors can 
happen to them. 
Our experiment was conducted with a lone pilot given the single task of navigating in an overland environment 
with control over only the aircraft’s heading. As such, it was impossible to crash the simulatior. In future 
experiments, we propose to give the subjects control over all three axes of flight, as well as perhaps  incorporating 
mission elements such as radio traffic or specified ‘time on target’. Finally, it would be informative and important to 
see how a crew of subjects, consisting of PAC, PNAC as well as crewmembers would perform, specifically with the 
research question of what mix of experience levels results in the best performance.  
These next steps are currently being developed in our own laboratory, but a much better solution will be to form 
a partnership with military and civil training centers who have full-motion simulators. Direct implementation of the 
results from this experiment to new procedures and technologies is difficult because it involves personal confidence. 
The most important result from the experiment is that there needs to be training on this subject to give pilots the 
ability to recognize that confidence does not correspond to correctness during navigation. A single simulator event, 
possibly conducted in conjunction could be implemented into the Naval Aviation Enterprise; we feel that the most 
appropriate place would be the Fleet Reserve Squadrons (FRS) along with the corresponding Army and Air Force 
helicopter training schools, based on the finding of this experiment. Results from this experiment could also be 
added to aviation physiology and safety center documents. 
Results from this experiment also suggest that helicopter navigation equipment is important for correct 
navigation performance. Any improvements in navigation equipment technology, that would reduce the reliance on 
visual navigation, would relate to less mishaps and mission failures. Current fleet navigation equipment requires 
large amount of pilot input. Reducing the pilot input requirements can allow the PNAC to better execute other duties 
in the cockpit. 
Currently GPS is considered a supplemental navigation devise, and it is not required to execute overland low-
level navigation. This experiment suggests that is not uncommon for pilots to misperceive their location just using 
visual navigation; the amount to which this is alleviated by GPS is an area for future research.  
To enhance the results of this experiment a larger sample size spanning different experience, to include 
‘currency’  and communities could be used. The larger sample size would allow for a better experience grouping of 
participants (expert, intermediate, and novice). Being able to effectively group the participants could provide 
insights into “overconfident” or “dangerous” population. This could pinpoint where dedicated time and technology 
needs to be spent. The experiment could also be conducted under realistic operation environments. These 
environments could be nighttime, emergencies, and different weather conditions. Again this would enhance the data 
for real world operations.The last future work is to combine model data to pilots as they are flying in a training 
simulator. This would be a real-time interactive training system that would notify pilots about the dangers and 
occurrence of misperception. This training would help reduce the amount of misperception during operational 
navigation. 
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Appendix 
Figure A2. Map of navigation route 1. This type of map was also used for map study. 
The features of this route that are noteworthy are that it follows easily marked 
valleys. Also, note that there are no large heading changes. 
Figure A1. Map of the practice route that participants used for map study. This view 
shows waypoints 1–4, and the according ‘doghouses’ which give the pilot distance and 
timing information enroute. 
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Figure A4. Intended (black) and actual (yellow) first auto-navigation route 
Figure A3. Map of navigation route 2. Note the challenging turns throughout and 
potential for overflying WP 3 and 5 and similar valleys at WP 7 and 9 
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